

Social Movements and the Integrated Urban Cycle

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1 Introduction and research interest

In recent years, there has been a rising interest in the impact of social movements on cities. So far, research has focused primarily on the interaction of local bottom-up initiatives with the political and societal institutions in cities, as well as urban policy frameworks in general. For instance, Martínez and Wissink (2021) have analyzed the »institutional alliances« between progressive urban movements and municipalist governments in Spanish cities. Other scholarship has addressed the role of movements and civic networks in urban regeneration processes after economic downturns or political changes (Rabbiosi 2016, Pradel-Miquel 2021). However, there has been little research on how social movements can aid the development of more just and stable cities that are resilient to economic or social upheavals by acting as an indicator of upcoming change.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the role of different social movements (e.g. labor union activities, civil uprisings or) within the evolution stages of cities. Specifically, we would like to examine the timing of their occurrence within the so-called Integrated Urban Cycle, a conceptualization that has been derived from a variety of urban cycles described by other researchers (e.g. economic cycles, the cycles of population growth and degrowth as well as innovation cycles). By looking at three historic examples, we want to analyze how the different strategies enacted by urban policymakers have catered to those social movements. We have devised the following research question for our work:

In what way can social movements alter the progression of urban development cycles?

Our particular research interest is rooted within the current developments in our hometown, Vienna, where large-scale road construction projects are facing strong civil disobedience from climate activists. Protesters argue that realizing those projects would, by inducing even more traffic for the urban agglomeration, counter the city's aim of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions. Just recently, there have been reports that institutional alliances

between climate activists and labor unionists are forming in Austria. This paper seeks to provide learnings for 21st century urban policymakers in Vienna about dealing with bottom-up movements, social uprisings and riots.

2 Cities and social movements

In this first theoretical chapter, it will be discussed how social movements can be defined and what makes them a phenomenon specific to urban areas.

2.1 What makes a movement social?

The origins of social movements are classified differently in terms of time, depending on the definition. Lahusen (2012) refers to »social forces that intervene in social change with the aim of preventing, forcing or changing certain social developments« and locates the origin of the term within the French Revolution. This abstract definition leaves room for including a variety of movements – for instance the labor movements of the early 20th century, feminist as well as fascist movements (Gestring et al. 2014).

Another widely used definition that seems to have prevailed in movement research over decades is that of Roth and Rucht (1987/2008), who describe social movements as follows: »We speak [...] of social movements when a network of groups and organizations, supported by a collective identity, secures a certain continuity« and strives to »shape social change« by means of »variable forms of organization and action.« In this way, social movements are distinguished from »protest episodes, fads, and random constellations.« Lahusen (2012) also comes to similar conclusions in his definition of the four characteristics of social movements. Like Roth and Rucht, he sees the carriers of social movements in the form of a »broad network« as a central feature. As a second characteristic, the author considers the distinction of social movements from »fashions and scenes.« As a third and fourth characteristic, Lahusen mentions »collective actions« and »continuity«, which he describes as a »relatively structured and permanent network of actions stabilized by [...] collective identity features.«

A somewhat different definition was established by Bareis et al. (2010): »We only talk about social movements, on the other hand, when they gain duration, give themselves a 'name', form spokespersons and address demands to state authorities, companies or other institutions«. Based on this, Gestring et al. (2014) established three prerequisites for actors in social movements:

- **diagnostic ability:** the eye for socially relevant problems
- **articulation ability:** the skills to articulate these social deficits
- **organizational ability:** the competence to organize actions and protests.

These prerequisites, in turn, lead the authors to conclude that social movements »require cultural and social capital to a degree typically found among members of academically educated middle classes« (Gestring et al. 2014). This claim raises further research interest, as it can be questioned whether cultural capital is really decisive or whether it is rather the individual affection that drives people to organize and engage.

2.2 Approaches to the definition of social movements

During our research, a large number of social movements was screened and knowledge about them was acquired. Even though we consider them all »social movements«, we attempted to establish a possible classification. Before that, it should be said that this classification does not claim to be exhaustive and is only a first attempt. First of all, it can be stated that the forms of protest and also the topics have changed in the course of the last 100 years, which roughly cover the time period under consideration in this paper. While industrial strikes or movements were often initiated in the past, the most explosive topic of modern-day protests is the climate crisis. Nevertheless, there are also working-class movements nowadays, such as the strikes over the wage negotiations for the new collective agreement.

In order to give an overview of the multitude of social movements, three possible forms of classification were considered:

- classification by form of protest (strike, occupation, demonstration, ...)
- classification by form of organization (unions, grassroots, ...)
- classification by interests / motives (tenants, workers, climate activists, animal rights, feminist activists, ...)

2.3 From working class uprisings to grassroots organizations – the evolution of social movements

If we look back 100 years, there were social movements all around the globe, but they mainly covered two political dimensions. On the one hand, there was a shortage of affordable housing in many places, which became even more apparent in the years after World War I. On the other hand, this was also the time when trade unions first started rising. In some cases, these two types of movements (tenants and workers) also allied (for example in the Glasgow Rent Strike of 1915). The forms of demonstration ranged from demonstrations and marches to strikes and occupations (Gestring et al. 2014).

While earlier (urban) social movements were predominantly driven by people with the same social background and similar interests (e.g. workers or tenants), protests today are explicitly organized as »cooperative networks in which groups with different institutional constitution and ideological orientations come together« (Gestring et al. 2014).

These networks are characterized in particular by »overarching cooperation between different grassroots initiatives that are independent of political parties« (ibid.). In this context, urban policy developments and controversial projects are increasingly criticized and claims to participation are made.

In particular, the works of Manuel Castells (1975, 1977, 1983) and Henri Lefèbvre (1968, 1972, 1974) are instructive for analyzing the current debate on urban protest. With his demand for a »right to the city«, Lefèbvre (1968) raises the claim for a self-empowerment of urban political actors. In his essay »le droit à la ville« he formulates »the right to the city is like a cry and a demand« (quoted from Marcuse 2009), postulating that the demand comes from those whose »most elementary material needs are not satisfied, the desire (cry) from those who are superficially integrated but alienated« (Gebhardt and Holm 2011).

Another strand of discussion on the current development of social movements considers them in the context of neoliberal reorganization policies and considers demands as enacted within the spectrum of fundamental systemic and social change (Gestring et al. 2014). Mayer (2011) sees in these movements a »direct reaction to the tendencies of privatization and liberalization of urban tasks.« Especially in the climate movement, calls for comprehensive socio-economic systemic change are growing louder. For example, the »Lobau Bleibt!« movement in Vienna has evolved from a project-oriented social movement to a critique of the neoliberal, growth-oriented system. In this context, it is exciting that climate activists join forces in alliances with other social groups and show solidarity towards the same goal – most recently with the trade union VIDA (SCNCC 2022).

2.4 Civil uprisings as an urban phenomenon

On the question of whether and why social movements are predominantly associated with urban spaces, there are different approaches in theory. Harvey (2011), for example, sees the city as causally involved in the emergence of conflict and – moreover – as shaping the thematic contestation. In particular, the built environment and political functions make cities places of political resistance, which allow for a disruption of the urban economy (Gestring et al. 2014). Other urban scholars seem to see the potential of urban protest in finding a broad social resonance. Moreover, cities have become the main sites of capitalism, where the contradictions and conflicts that accompany it become most visible and vulnerable to attack. Public spaces and their significance also contribute to the visibility of protests in cities. These would establish a counter-power through their unifying character (ibid. 2014). Lefèbvre (1968) also sees the »potential for change in urban mobilization.«

However, the fundamental question arises whether, with today's degree of urbanization, most conflicts and disputes take place in cities anyway, where people live together in a confined space. However, urban protests now tend to take place over longer periods of time and deal with issues that are of greater political significance. Local protests, on the other hand, are mainly directed against specific projects and end when the project is either canceled or implemented.

The interrelationship between cities and social movements is described in more detail by Castells (1983), who introduced the theory of »three different, though inter-related processes« which cities are shaped by. These processes would be:

- conflicts over the definition of urban meaning,
- conflicts over the adequate performance of urban functions (these conflicts can arise from different interests and values within the same accepted framework, or from different approaches about how to perform a shared goal of urban function),
- conflicts over the adequate symbolic expression of urban meaning and (or) functions.

Whenever new »urban meaning« is produced, »urban social change« is also created. »Urban social meaning« is produced by one of the four following processes (Castells 1983):

- the dominant class in a given society – having the institutional power to restructure social forms according to interests and values – changes the existing meaning (urban renewal),
- a dominated class accomplishes a partial or total revolution and changes the meaning of the city (for instance the workers of Glasgow in 1915 impose

- housing as a social service, not as a commodity),
- a social movement develops its own meaning over a given space in contradiction to the structurally dominant meaning,
- a social mobilization imposes a new urban meaning in contradiction to the institutionalized urban meaning and against the interests of the dominant class.

2.5 Reactions of policymakers to social movements?

Historically, there have been different ways for governmental decision makers to have reacted to protests. The successes and failures of these reactions are summarized here in order to assess how policymakers could potentially react to social uprisings in the future.

A look at the past shows that a variety of protests have been responded to restrictively and violently (for example, Detroit 1960). Although potential police repression was feared, in some cases protesters did not allow themselves to be diverted from their goals. They sacrificed themselves and, in many cases, ultimately celebrated success. In particular, trade unions had great leverage for change, as industrial strikes entailed massive economic consequences.

While in the past protests were often met with violence, politicians in Austria are currently using other means in most cases. In civil disobedience actions, activists are still violently evicted and criminalized, but registered protests are tolerated and supported by the police.

Another current trend that activists are increasingly concerned about is political appropriation through participation (Gestring et al. 2014). This is understood as a political procedure that »liquidates conflict formulation in favor of consensus building« (ibid.). Thus, attempts are made to prevent protests in advance and to find a consensus. While this approach is also increasingly desired by the general population, it delegitimizes any form of criticism of the fundamental if it is disregarded that in some cases simply no consensus can be found. In general, however, there is currently already a »participation euphoria« since participation procedures would be seen as a »feature of social democratization« and would strengthen »citizen power« (Roth 2010). The fact that lower social strata or marginalized groups have little or no share in participation procedures is often ignored in the debate (Gestring et al. 2014).

3 Understanding urban cycles

Tracing dynamics of urban evolution requires a profound knowledge of the growth and degrowth processes that shape a city's development. In his critically acclaimed

book »The Triumph of the City«, Edward Glaeser (2011) refers to depopulation and economic shrinkage as the key factors for the decline of urban areas. On the other end of the spectrum, Glaeser appears to associate urban progress with population growth, innovation and economic prosperity. However, when it comes to understanding the complexity of urban development processes, there are many more parameters to be observed. International urban researchers have made numerous attempts to conceptualize the perpetual dynamics of cities, describing either *Urban Evolutions* (Duranton 2007), *Life Cycles of Cities* (Brezis and Krugman 1997, Czamanski and Broitman 2016, Pinto and Sablik 2016) or *Urban Dynamics* (Faberman 2005). This paper aims to add to the current state of research by suggesting a concept called the *Integrated Urban Cycle*, which will be introduced in chapter 3.4.

3.1 Indicators for urban growth and decline

Urban development is subject to a variety of internal and external influence factors. Based on an extensive review of scientific literature, we have compiled six important parameters for the rise and decline of cities and metropolitan areas:

Population and migration

When it comes to monitoring urban growth and degrowth processes, the population number is arguably the most striking indicator. Not only does population growth entail the construction of physical structures (housing, commercial buildings, transport infrastructure, social facilities etc.), it also sparks innovation and entrepreneurship. Glaeser (2011) argues that cities, by bringing people closely together in a small area, create direct interactions that lead to innovation processes. This reasoning is backed by Czamanski and Broitman (2016), who assert that »talented people choose to live in larger cities«, creating an advantage for bigger agglomerations. In most booming cities nowadays, population growth is promoted by immigration. As research shows, migration does not only give cities more inhabitants, but it also promotes entrepreneurship. Czamanski and Broitman (2016) point out that places with large outbound migration streams experience lower rates of new firm foundations, indicating that those who do not migrate are less entrepreneurial. Beyond that, there is empirical evidence that population outflows hurt the lower-income households that are left behind, leading to high poverty rates in declining city centers (Pinto and Sablik 2016).

GDP per capita dynamics

According to the OECD, the core indicator for the economic performance of a country (or a city, respectively) is the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which meas-

ures economic activity or income per person (OECD 2013). The GDP per capita is therefore often used to describe the prosperity of urban agglomerations. Czamanski and Broitman (2016) argue that innovative individuals generally seek higher incomes and thus migrate to higher GDP cities. However, they also show that when the rate of inbound migration exceeds the GDP growth rate, resulting in a slowdown in per capita income, this eventually leads to population decline. In recent years, there has been a growing concern in the scientific communities about the use of the GDP as the ultimate indicator of a city's well-being. Khalil (2012) laments that the GDP per capita is incapable of indicating the inequality of wealth distribution, suggesting the use of quality-of-life-indicators instead.

(Technological) innovations

In the literature reviewed, cities are commonly referred to as places of innovation exchange and technological revolutions (Brezis and Krugman 1997, Czamanski and Broitman 2016, Duranton 2007, Faberman 2005, Glaeser 2011). According to Bairoch (1998), older cities are likely to remain locked into traditional industries and therefore disadvantaged during major technological shifts, which are more likely to be embraced by upstart agglomerations. Arguing along the same lines, Brezis and Krugman (1997) assert that revolutionary new technologies and production modes tend to be exploited in new centers. Despite the raw state of the technology, small upstart centers are still able to compete on the market thanks to lower land rents and wages. According to the researchers, cities that fail to shift to new technologies will lose their innovative firms, shrink in population and eventually decline. Czamanski and Broitman (2016) agree that small cities experience faster boosts from the launch of new, revolutionary products while larger agglomerations take more time to embody the technological shift. However, they also point to the fact that small innovators can learn from the production techniques of established companies.

Employment

While passing through its (technological) innovation cycles, a city typically experiences employment gains in one sector, while other sectors lose workforce. In his research, Duranton (2007) shows that net employment changes in cities are always smaller than gross employment flows due to the offset between employment gains and losses of different sectors. Significant changes in employment rates can either be attributed to transformations in agglomeration economies (e.g. after the discovery of new innovations) or to technological changes that lead to greater automation (Pinto and Sablik 2016).

Housing stock

In some cases, the rise and decline of a city is mirrored the development of its housing stock. Pinto and Sablik (2016)

contend that, since buildings are very durable goods, it can take a long time for a city to move through its physical life cycle. Whilst building new houses is profitable during times of population growth, the housing stock does not simply disappear when the demand is shrinking. The surplus in the housing stock lowers rent prices, drawing lower-skilled and lower-income households into the city. The most prominent American example for this developmental path is Detroit, which lost over one million people between 1950 and 2008 – 58 percent of its population. As Glaeser (2001) argues, demolishing empty houses might be a viable strategy for cities to tackle large-scale vacancy issues.

Economic micro-level dynamics

Whilst GDP dynamics and innovation processes are usually observed within a larger scope, it can be particularly insightful to monitor economic micro-level dynamics in cities. Faberman (2005) has synthesized the existing literature on labor dynamics and urban agglomerations, presenting new evidence on small-scale processes that indicate the rise and the decline of cities. He shows that growing cities tend to have higher rates of job creation and destruction. Also, there is a relatively young distribution of establishments in growing cities because of more entries to the market and a more competitive selection process. The firms surviving those selection processes benefit from exceptionally high growth rates in earnings.

3.2 Existing concepts for urban cycles

As mentioned above, there have been numerous attempts at devising a model for urban development cycles. In the following section, three established approaches will be introduced. Along with the findings from the literature review on the indicators for growth and decline, those existing concepts provide the foundation for the conceptualization of the *Integrated Urban Cycle* in chapter 3.4.

The Economic-Migratory Cycle

In their research paper, Czamanski and Broitman (2016) introduce what they call the »Full Life Cycle of Urban Evolution«. As Figure 1 shows, the cycle is the result of the interaction between migration and GDP dynamics. In their actor-based model, the researchers include two types of firms (large and traditional, small and innovative) as well as two types of inhabitants (the migrants and the ones who stay put). The people who migrate are more likely to start new companies or work for innovative firms than those who stay in their home city. During innovation processes, varying time scales apply for the different kinds of firms: Whereas young, entrepreneurial firms have relatively short passage times through innovation cycles, old and established firms take longer to embrace new products or production processes. In both cases, innovation processes generate GDP dynamics that influence migration streams. Creative people tend to seek higher incomes and thus work for innovative firms, contributing to the creation of new innovations. Once the migration stream exceeds the rate of growth in GDP, the positive feedback disappears and the per capita income decreases. This leads to a gradual slowdown of the population growth and eventually to emigration.

The Technological Innovation Cycle

Another circular concept developed by Brezis and Krugman (1997) focusses on the role of technological innovations in the growth and degrowth of urban agglomerations. For their simplified model, the researchers made the assumption of a given labor force L that produces and consumes two goods – food and manufactures. They situated their labor force within a spatial economy organized into city-regions, each consisting of a central business district and a surrounding food-supplying hinterland. Technology was assumed to progress in two different ways: Within one technological generation, there is a steady learning based on localized experience. In case of a major technical




Figure 1: The Economic-Migratory Cycle

innovation, previous experience becomes irrelevant. After running their model, the researchers described the following circular process: When a new, innovative technology is introduced, it is initially inferior to the traditional one in absolute numbers. However, it has a higher utility in urban regions with small populations, low rents and transportation costs. At the same time, established companies in old centers do not make adaptations since they can remain productive with the old technology due to their experience. As the new technology matures, workers in the new center increase their productivity through learning. From a certain point on, the smaller city grows at the expense of the established center. Eventually, the new technology might become superior to the original one, allowing the new center to overtake the old one.

The Housing Stock Cycle

Focusing on the dynamics of a city’s physical development and decay, Pinto and Sablik (2016) have come up with what can be described as the Housing Stock Cycle. The concept is based on the concentric zone model developed by Burgess et al. (1925), which assumes the existence of a central business district (CBD) surrounded by several rings with dedicated uses (e.g. working-class zone, residential zone, commuter zone). Since this concentric urban shape almost exclusively exists in American cities, the Housing Stock Cycle is not universally applicable. In their research paper, Pinto and Sablik (2016) portray a newly constructed city in which the buildings near the CBD are the most desirable ones and thus tend to be occupied by a mix of firms and wealthy residents. As the buildings gradually age and decay, wealthy households move to newer developments in the next ring, leaving behind mostly low-income residents. This process is repeated multiple times, moving the city border outward. Once the old, deteriorated buildings in the inner ring are renovated or redeveloped, wealthier households and firms move back towards the CBD, restarting the cycle. According to the researchers, similar circular processes have taken place in cities like Chicago or Philadelphia.

3.3 Time frames and speeds of urban cycles

As Duranton and Puga (2014) have shown in their study of U.S., Spanish and French cities, urban agglomerations go through life cycles that comprise periods of slow and fast growth as well as periods of stagnation and shrinkage. Beyond that, according to Czimanski and Broitman (2016), the time scales appropriate to observe urban processes may vary greatly. While some processes take place within decades (e.g. structural changes), others can be observed over several years (e.g. firm development stages) or months (e.g. individual migration decisions). Devising urban cycles can be particularly challenging due to the fact that all those processes running at different speeds




Figure 2: The Housing Stock Cycle

are interrelated. Drawing on statistical data for French and U.S. cities, Duranton (2007) has made an attempt at stylizing urban evolution dynamics. His research shows that while location changes of industries across cities occur relatively fast, cities move up and down the urban hierarchy (in terms of employment numbers) much slower. In contrast, the total distribution of city sizes is fairly stable over time. He therefore concludes that fast, innovation driven shocks in industries lead to slow dynamics of growth or degrowth. These changes occur within a stable distribution.

3.4 Conceptualization of the Integrated Urban Cycle

In an attempt to condense our findings from the literature review into one holistic model, we have developed the concept of an *Integrated Urban Cycle*, which we will later use to describe the possible effects of social movements on urban rise and decline in our case studies. The model

simplifies complex dynamic processes into sine waves of different amplitudes and time extents, integrating three aspects mentioned in the literature review: Population growth and shrinkage processes are blended with innovation processes and housing construction activity. GDP dynamics were omitted, since to our understanding they are merely a representation of combined population and innovation cycles. There are three stages that elapse during one pass of the cycle: In the first stage (*Euphoria*), small-scale innovation is in bloom and workers move to the city from other places. There is a lot of construction activity going on, so the housing stock rises substantially. When the population increase outnumbers the GDP dynamics, innovation gradually comes to a halt and the exodus of businesses and residents (*Depopulation*) begins. In an attempt to »built their way back to success«, cities continue to construct new houses. The old physical structures, however, remain, leaving behind disadvantaged low-income households. Once the city officials accept the urban decline, the third stage (*Recovery*) is started. In some cases, city administration will try to reduce the housing stock by demolishing old vacancies, decreasing the city size. In the new, small-scale structures, new innovation may start blooming again.

The concept of the *Integrated Urban Cycle* is graphically represented in Figure 3. Before starting the empirical part of our research, we would like to acknowledge the weaknesses of our model. First of all, the Integrated Urban Cycle simplifies very complex processes into regular sine waves and geometrical forms that are repeated over time. It does not include long-term processes that span over multiple passes of urban cycles, such as overall population growth or shrinkage in the long perspective. Also, it assumes that all passes through the population cycle have the same amplitude and time extent, which is never the

case in real cities. The *Integrated Urban Cycle* does not represent a perfectly managed city, but brings together the dynamics of initial success, temporary stagnation and eventual decline due to mismanagement from urban policymakers. Furthermore, it fails to take into account the influence of external factors like the climate crises and natural disasters, which will have a rising impact on cities in the future.

4 Hypothesis

The hypothesis of our research is that if urban policymakers manage to perceive social movements as indicators of upcoming change and react accordingly, negative consequences to the cities may be averted. Referring to our model of the *Integrated Urban Cycle*, we believe that the three evolution stages of the model (*Euphoria, Depopulation and Recovery*) can be shortened, extended, amplified or weakened, depending on the suitability of the measures taken by city administration in reaction to social uprisings.

5 Case Studies

For the empirical part of our research, we have looked at three significantly different historic cases of social movements in the context of urban growth, stagnation or decline. Based on a thorough review of the history and context of the movement, we have examined the reactions made by urban policymakers or corporate actors. Eventually, we attempted to assess the timing and role of the social movements within the *Integrated Urban Cycle*.




Figure 3: The Housing Stock Cycle

5.1 Case 1: Seoul, South Korea

In the South Korean capital Seoul, the high-speed industrial development during the 1960s and 1970s entailed a process of rapid urbanization that continued till the late 1980s. The following case study aims to briefly outline the different stages of urban rights discourses against housing redevelopment and tenant displacement from the 1980s to today and to analyze them against the backdrop of the Integrated Urban Cycle.

5.1.1 History and context

Less than two months after the collapse of the Park Chung-Hee dictatorship in 1979, a military coup led by General Chun Doo-Hwan established the so-called Fifth Republic, a political system that kept South Korea more or less in its old societal order. The state continued to use its coercive power to violently oppress anti-governmental struggles (Shin 2018). The authoritarian development till the late 1980s involved the clearing of slums in Seoul and the launch of redevelopment policies like the Joint Redevelopment Programme (*Hapdong Jaegaebal*) that affected about 10 percent of the municipal population of Seoul (Shin and Kim 2016). A report by the Asian Coalition of Housing Rights in 1989 revealed that between 1983 and 1988, roughly 720.000 tenants were forcefully evicted from their homes (ACHR 1989). As a consequence of industrial restructuring from 1980 on, investments in the built environment started to shift towards speculative assets in the real estate sector. From the mid-1980s on, Seoul was subject to a significant rewriting of its urban landscape. This development was supported by the authoritarian state that intended to reshape and modernize the city at the time of preparation for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Qiao and Shin 2022). During the 1990s, the effects of democratization and liberalization became notable. Political reforms enabled the establishment of local assemblies and the institutionalization of social movements. Rising neoliberal interests coupled with a liberalization of the financial industry led to a significant decrease in affordable housing for the urban poor, yet the developmental state retained its close ties with the private businesses (Shin 2018). While the first public housing programmes for low-income families were set up in 1989, it was not until 2012 that Seoul introduced a comprehensive social housing plan (Chung et al. 2020).

5.1.2 Social movements and political reactions

Korea's history of developmental alliances between the state and large business conglomerates (*Chaebols*) dates back to the dictatorship era between 1961 to 1979, where the authoritarian state already used evictions in pursuing urban development. Back then, protests remained sporadic and isolated (Shin 2018). As the urban reconstruction intensified during the 1980s, especially after the introduction of the *Hapdong Jaegaebal* programme,

tenants' protests increased and became more organized. The protesters claimed the **Right to Subsistence** (*Saengjon'gwon*), demanding a governmental provision of alternative relocation housing, especially in the form of public rental housing (Shin 2018). With the intent of avoiding political and societal denigration, the tenants chose to reason with the state rather than protesting violently (Qiao and Shin 2022). Some low-income evictees were also part of the cross-class alliance that spearheaded the Democratic Uprising in June 1987, leading to concessions by the authoritarian state and the first direct presidential elections. At the peak of the democracy movement, the Seoul Council of Evictees was established in 1987, providing city-wide support for individual struggles (Shin 2018). The evictee protests during the 1980s eventually led to the launch of a programme that offered public rental housing as part of an in-kind compensation for eligible tenants (Kim et al. 1996). Despite the concessions made by the state, protests resumed. Starting in the early 1990s, the **Right to Housing** (*Jugeo'gwon*) became the new keyword of the anti-eviction movement in Seoul. The protests were no longer confined to the term of subsistence but demanded the provision of affordable and securely tenured housing as basic human rights, regardless of the tenants' socio-economic circumstances (Shin 2018). A major milestone was the establishment of the National Coalition for Housing Rights in 1990 that made efforts to legislate a Basic Housing Rights Act (Qiao and Shin 2022). In the early 2000s, following the Asian financial crisis, the state continued to promote real estate development in Korea (Ha 2010). Policies like the Basic Housing Rights Act were considered an inhibition in the country's economic recovery. In the early 2000s, Seoul's mayor Lee Myung-Bak initiated a mega-district redevelopment programme targeting districts that had not been subject to urban redevelopment during the past decades. Following the introduction of the programme, housing protesters turned their attention towards promoting the **Right to Human Settlements** (*Jeongju'gwon*), emphasizing the need for livable neighborhoods (Qiao and Shin 2022). The movement acknowledged the need to look beyond individual housing units and to consider a wider context of settlement (Shin 2018). In 2003, the National Council of Center to Victims of Forced Evictions, a civic self-help organization was founded. The organization made efforts to »Prevent quality of life from degrading by redevelopment that endangers residents' *jeongju'gwon*« (NCCVFE 2003). In the last 10 to 15 years, the discourse has shifted towards another claim – the **Right to the City** (*Dosi'gwon*). In 2009, when a protest by small business tenants in Seoul was beaten down violently involving the death of six people, housing activists and critical scholars returned to challenging the state's policy of coerced evictions (Shin 2018). As a direct result of being excluded from the compensation regime introduced in 1989, small business owners had gradually become the main proponents of the anti-eviction movement during the 2000s. Human rights advocacy groups and intellectuals came together to campaign for the




Figure 4: Timing and role of the Seoul social movements within the Integrated Urban Cycle

enactment of a law to prevent forced evictions (Qiao and Shin 2022). Today, urban protest movements in Seoul use the term »adequate housing« to express their resistance against forced eviction and in order to promote the right to human urban settlements. The efforts of the progressive social movements culminated in the establishment of the National Basic Housing Rights Act in 2015 (Shin 2018).

5.1.3 Timing and role of movements within the Integrated Urban Cycle

Both the *Saengjon'gwon* and the *Jugeo'gwon* movement occurred during times of urban expansion in Seoul, yet under vastly different political circumstances. The Right to Subsistence (*Saengjon'gwon*) protests during the 1980s were initially rather ineffective, yet they drew large benefit from the Democratic Revolution in 1987. This indicates that the vigor of urban protests can be heavily influenced by the surrounding political and societal environment. Ultimately, the government catered to parts of the *Saengjon'gwon* movement's demands by introducing a compensation programme for evicted residential tenants. In contrast, the Right to Housing (*Jugeo'gwon*) protests failed to achieve their primary target, the implementation of the Basic Housing Rights Act – at least back in the 1990s and early 2000s. The success of the *Jugeo'gwon* movement was mainly hindered by the political consequences of the Asian financial crisis. Introducing legislative measures was seen as a potential drawback to the economic recovery of the country. Still, the National Coalition for Housing Rights emerged from the protests as an umbrella organization for a number of social movement organizations. The Right to Human Settlements (*jeongju'gwon*) came about during a stage of stagnation in Seoul. Between 2000 and 2009, the city's population slightly decreased from 9.88 to 9.80 millions. In the literature reviewed, hardly any specific

political reactions to the *jeongju'gwon* protests were mentioned. However, the founding of the National Council of Center to Victims of Forced Evictions marked an important step in strengthening the interests of the low-income tenants still subjected to coercion evictions. Finally, the last protest wave demanding the Right to the City (*Dosi'gwon*) happened during a time of slight urban growth. The movement saw a shift from residential tenants to small business owners and sparked massive debates among scholars, activists and NGOs. Eventually, the *Dosi'gwon* protests managed to facilitate the introduction of the Basic Housing Rights Act in 2015 but have so far not managed to protect commercial tenants from forced evictions.

5.2 Case 2: Detroit, MI, USA

Detroit's story of growth and depopulation has been held up by many scholars as the prime example of the failure of mono-industrial agglomerations in the 20th century. During its automotive heyday, when the city gained its nickname »Motor City«, hundreds of thousands of blue-collar manufacturing workers were employed in Detroit's large car factories. It is hardly surprising that the city became one of the prime locales of the American labor movement from the 1930s on. In this case study, it will be examined how the suburbanization of Detroit's automotive manufacturing in the post-war period accelerated the unionizing of workers and how corporations reacted to the protests.

5.2.1 History and context

The era of manufacturing in the Rust Belt started long before mass-produced automobiles were introduced.

During the 19th century, cities like Chicago, St. Louis, Buffalo and Detroit capitalized from their situation along the Illinois and Michigan Canal, a major waterway that connected the Great Lakes to East Coast cities like New York. Between 1850 and 1890, Detroit's population increased from 21.000 to 206.000 people (Glaeser 2011). By the end of the century, the city had built up a diverse and prosperous economy that centered around the production of cast-iron stoves, railroad cars, ships and cigars (Smith 2001). The agglomeration attracted young and innovative entrepreneurs, leading to the foundation of large and successful businesses like the Detroit Dry Dock company, one of the most important ship manufacturers in the Lake Area during that period (Glaeser 2011). Around the turn of the century, Detroit transformed itself into the undisputed worldwide capital of the automotive industry, employing hundreds of thousands of skilled and unskilled workers (Smith 2001). At that time, the Ford Motor Company set new benchmarks for industrial production standards and management practices, introducing assembly lines to automate the process of car manufacturing. Even though the composition of Ford's workforce made a substantial shift towards unskilled labor, the automotive companies were still the highest-paying employers in the United States by the mid-1920s (Wood 2004). As the small, dynamic companies were gradually devoured by bigger corporations, a process of suburbanization started to set in. In 1917, Henry Ford opened the infamous River Rouge plant southwest of Detroit, a large facility with dedicated docks, railway tracks and a power plant (Glaeser 2011). When transport costs dropped significantly after World War II – ironically a direct consequence of the rise of cheap motorized vehicles – former manufacturing centers like Detroit lost their strategic advantage. From the 1960s on, Detroit started suffering a considerable population exodus, a process that has not been brought to a halt until today.

5.2.2 Social movements and political reactions

Though organized labor has existed in Detroit since the 1830s, when the first craft unions for typographers and cordwainers were established, unions played a rather subordinate role during the early 20th century. This »paralysis of the labor movement« in the 1920s (Wood 2004) has been attributed to new forms of corporate paternalism, the repression of strikes and the strict craft orientation of the AFL, the American Federation of Labor (Cohen 1990, Gerstle 1989, Brody 1998, Montgomery 1987). During the latter half of the decade, wage rates became subject to frequent changes and payment cuts became more common (Wood 2004). Until the Great Depression, however, membership numbers in Detroit's labor movement were fairly low. It was not until the mid-1930s that the city became the epicenter of the American labor movement. When the United Automobile Workers (UAW), an industrial union that would later become one of the most

influential ones in American history, established its headquarters in Detroit in 1936, union membership started growing rapidly. After General Motors officially recognized the UAW as the representing agent for its members following a sit-down strike in 1937, similar protests were held all over Detroit during the next week (Wood 2004). When labor union representatives gathered at a pedestrian overpass at River Rouge in May 1937, Ford's security staff attacked the protesters, leading to a lot of negative press for Ford. Anyway, it took another four years until the Ford Motor Company officially signed a contract with the UAW in 1941 (Stewart and Giese 1989). In 1935, the federal government helped strengthen unions by passing the National Labor Relations act which made it more difficult to fire striking workers. The act entailed the formation of closed shops, agreements between industrial unionists and company representatives that all employees were required to join the union. In closed shops, it was hard to pressure striking workers since it was impossible to hire non-unionized people alternatively (Glaeser 2011). The labor movement continued to thrive until the Taft-Hartley-Act was introduced in 1947, allowing states to legislate so-called right-to-work laws that prevented the formation of closed shops. Though union membership numbers continued to rise during the 1950s, the Taft-Hartley-Act led to manufacturers moving towards one of the nineteen right-to-work states (Shister 1958, Glaeser 2011). In the 1960s, when the industrial exodus became notable, there was a wave of riots in Detroit that was met with a surge of racist police brutality. In the aftermath of the riots, the depopulation of Detroit continued seemingly inexorable. During the office term of Coleman Young who was elected mayor in 1973, Detroit attempted to build itself out of its decline, yet failed to halt the process of depopulation (Glaeser 2011). From 1950 to 2010, the city lost 62 percent of its inhabitants, a total of 1.1 million people.

5.2.3 Timing and role of movements within the Integrated Urban Cycle

Detroit is a fairly representative example for a pass of the *Integrated Urban Cycle*. When Detroit's automotive workers started unionizing in large numbers, the city was going through a stage of massive population growth and industrial prosperity. Although the decline of industrial agglomerations like Detroit can be attributed largely to automation processes in manufacturing, the question remains whether proper (political or corporate) reactions to trade union activities could have slowed the population exodus. The dynamics triggered by the Taft-Hartley-Act in the 1950s have been augmented by the conservative American politics of the 1980s. One could argue that the big automotive corporations like General Motors or Ford could have treated the wave of unionization during the 1930s and 1940s as an incentive to change their growth-oriented business policies towards a more sustain-

able production mode. Since there is still a lack of empirical evidence, it would be worthwhile further investigating this aspect. Another form of social movement that has been part of Detroit's tumultuous history were the riots during the 1960s. The uprisings occurred at a point when the depopulation from Motor City had already become substantial. Glaser (2011) argues that the policies enacted by 1960s Detroit mayor Jerome Cavenagh failed to »control the forces that were convulsing his city"«. He blames Cavenagh for building large structures and razing slums at a time of depopulation, similar to what his successor Coleman Young did from the 1970s on (Glaeser 2011). Jerome Cavenagh promised fairer law enforcement in the light of the 1967 riots, yet he failed to tackle the actual root of the social upheavals – the lack of perspective in a city suffering from economic decline and racial inequality. If Cavenagh and Young had tackled the ongoing depopulation process by reducing the housing stock and using federal funds to renovate desolate residential buildings, the decline of Detroit could have been less severe and uncontrolled.

5.3 Glasgow, Scotland

A look at Glasgow around the time of World War I and the years that followed reveals a dynamic industrial city that grew to become the second largest city in the British Empire through the manufacture of munitions. As in other cities, this economic boom has also led to uncontrolled growth, high rents and finally to civil disobedience.

5.3.1 History and context

The massive influx of workers into Glasgow led to rapid urban growth, which turned into uncontrolled growth

during the early 20th century. The demand for housing increased rapidly, while 11 % of Glasgow's residential properties were vacant due to speculation. This imbalance was responded to in 1911 with the House Letting and Rating Act, which gave legal protection to the tenants and allowed monthly lets for low-income dwellings. These monthly payments, on the other hand, allowed landlords to raise rents on a monthly basis (Castells 1983).

In 1913, John McLean, Glasgow's Marxist leader and leader of the SDF party (Social Democratic Federation) organized the Scottish Federation of Tenants' Association to fight against the rent increases (ibid.). One year later, in 1914, the Glasgow Women's Housing Association was formed, which also played an important role in the 1915 Rent Strike. The supporting women expressed that »our husbands, sons and brothers are fighting the Prussians of Germany. We are fighting the Prussians of Patrick« (ibid.). In addition to the tenant's and women's associations, the trade unions and left-wing parties also backed the Rent Strike (ibid.).

5.3.2 Social movements and political reactions (The Rent Strike)

The Rent Strike was launched in September 1915. By October, 15.000 people were involved and within 2 months, 25.000 people had joined the strike and refused to pay their rents (ibid.). From the beginning on, the form of protest was to not pay rent increases, to protest against the eviction of strikers (even violently if necessary), and to organize large demonstration marches in the streets (ibid.). While the war brought limitations to protest, it also brought exciting leverage. A turning point to the rent strikes happened on November 17, when Mr. Nicholson, a




Figure 5: Timing and role of the Detroit social movements within the Integrated Urban Cycle

Glasgow landlord, hauled strikers into a small court, to let them »show cause why they should not be evicted for refusal not to pay rent« (RS21 2015). The Housewives' Committee immediately organized a »mass march of rent strikers« to the court, which later gave the protesters the name »Mrs. Barbour's Army« (ibid.). When the trade unions then also appeared at the court meeting and threatened strikes in the factories, the situation became increasingly explosive (Castells 1983). A spokesman of the trade union said that »the nation could do without the factory[managers] but could not do without these workers« (RS21 2015). The meeting continued for more hours but eventually, the sheriff gave way and prevailed upon the landlord to withdraw his cases against the rent strikers (RS21 2015).

8 Days later, on November 25, 1915, the government introduced the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interests (War Restrictions) Act, which limited rent increases to the rate of mortgage interest during the time of World War I (Castells 1983).

The strikes in Glasgow continued until 1934 and were dedicated to various other issues, such as the 40-hour week (Battle of George Square 1919) or unemployment. While these strikes achieved rather less success and violent measures were taken against the protesters, the Rent Strike in 1915 faced little repression and celebrated great success, as legal changes were introduced.

5.3.3 Timing and role of movements within the Integrated Urban Cycle

Starting around 1891 or 1892, a strong population growth became apparent in Glasgow. Within just one year, the population rose from almost 570.000 people to 670.000. However, this was also strongly due to an urban expansion in 1892 (Wellcome Library 1899). An urban expansion also took place in 1913, which again increased the population by more than 235.000 people and allowed Glasgow to

reach the 1 million mark. As in the years before, the population grew steadily away from these two jumps, reaching its peak in 1938, when the decline in numbers began. The large demonstrations are also documented up to about this time. Whether in fact the protests and the reaction to them could be a reason for the population decline is not assessable or strongly doubtful, considering the people who died due to the onset and continuation of World War II. Although several parties (including the left-wing parties) tried to put housing policy on the agenda during this period, little new housing was built. Nevertheless, the social movement can be credited with some successes, such as the agreement to suspend rent increases during World War I. The reaction of the political decision-makers to the protesters can certainly be classified as positive in comparison to, for example, Detroit, where civil uprisings were violently repressed.

6 Conclusion

Initially, we would like to note that the perspective we are taking in our research is one that is strongly coined by a Eurocentric view. For example, when we say that violent protests are a phenomenon of the past and only rarely occur nowadays, this refers primarily western cities with stable, democratic political systems. However, we also acknowledge and deeply condemn that at this moment, people who are fighting for their freedom rights are being confronted with the most violent form of oppression. We thus want to express our solidarity with the protesters in this work.

6.1 Potential of social movements

When pondering the question which social movements actually have potential for change, it is worth taking a look at the case studies and comparing them with current




Figure 6: Timing and role of the Glasgow social movements within the Integrated Urban Cycle

protest movements. In Glasgow as well as in Seoul, significant achievements were made. It is worthwhile taking a look at why there was an obliging reaction to the protesters' demands: Gestring et al. (2014) provide a possible answer to this by showing the connection between a »functioning« capitalist economy and a protest movement that threatens to endanger it. In the case of Glasgow, for example, a turning point occurred when the trade unions threatened a strike at the factory, which could have resulted in major economic damage. This example indicates that social movements able to generate economic pressure are more likely to be listened to in an attempt to find a common solution. The current climate protests, on the other hand, have been less successful to this point. This might be due to the fact that the climate crisis is not perceived as a direct economic threat by corporate actors. The long-term consequences seem to be ignored.

Accordingly, our recommendation for policymakers would be to view protests not only in their short-term context, but to consider the possible medium- to long-term implications. With special regard to the climate movement, protests should be understood as warning signals that the economic and social system is no longer properly functioning. Strikes could also be seen as indicators that the mode of doing business is fragile and vulnerable. Union demands are traditionally responded to with short-term agreements, but no thought is given to an in-depth systemic change. An intriguing question that arises is whether the decline in Detroit could also have been averted (or attenuated) if the union uprisings had been understood as a sign of necessary change. If the factory owners had understood that an adjustment of the production mode and new innovations were needed, Detroit might have taken a different development path.

6.2 How to react to social movements

As mentioned above, social movements should be approached in a cooperative way in order to understand the profound changes they might indicate. In general, policymakers should show empathy towards protests, as the resentment and frustration behind them could quickly become potentiated and dangerous. In the cases of Glasgow and Seoul, the sympathetic political reactions apparently contributed to stability. In the light of the currently growing crisis of democracy, it is even more important that policymakers listen to the concerns of protesters and keep the bigger picture in mind. In the case of the climate movement, of course, this proves to be particularly difficult, as policies are supported and appropriated by various interest groups, including the Federation of Industries. The storming of the Capitol in the USA shows very clearly how vulnerable democratic systems are. People increasingly feel misunderstood and have lost confidence in politics. Another example of how misguided decisions were made in times of emerging social movements can be seen

in Detroit's attempt to build the city back into success. Our assumption is that once the population decline has begun, further building will not slow this process down. We would therefore recommend dealing with the existing built structure during such times, activating and renovating vacant properties, all at a scale consistent with the prevailing dynamic.

6.3 Where the cases contradict theoretical findings

A common characteristic that we could find in at least two cases (Glasgow and Seoul) is that social movements can be formed by several different organizations and associations. If we recall the theoretical introduction at the beginning of the paper, this circumstance contradicts to some extent the definition of social movements. Lahusen (2012) as well as Roth and Rucht (2008) see a broad network behind social movements as well, but Gestring (2014) adds that today's networks have »different institutional constitution and ideological orientations« compared to historical ones. With regard to Glasgow, for example, this addition does not apply, as the protests were indeed characterized by diverse supporters of different institutions and ideologies (e.g. left-wing parties, housewives' association, tenant union).

6.4 Reflection on the Integrated Urban Cycle

The fact that the appearance of the *Integrated Urban Cycle* (IUC) needs to be adapted from city to city was recognized during the research process, hence our slight adjustments for the three cases. Unfortunately, the lack of availability or fine-grained (historical) statistical data led to gaps in the cycle – to which no clear conclusions could be made. In general, it seems difficult to distill specific conclusions from the model. We have thus come to the conclusion that the *Integrated Urban Cycle* is a useful tool for forming new research questions and hypotheses rather than a potent basis for case studies. We acknowledge that the impact of singular social movements might be too weak to deduce clear conclusions about their intertwinedness with urban growth and shrinkage processes. Historically, the two world wars in particular – primarily in the Glasgow case – have made it difficult to interpret population figures with relation to social movements. In general, externalities weaken the model and are likely to make it much more difficult to apply in the future. Irreversible shrinkage processes are bound to occur in cities that are subject to the climate catastrophe due to their locations. This raises another important question: Can cities always be saved? Perhaps, they could have been if politicians had listened to the climate protests earlier and had seen them as an indicator of upcoming change.

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